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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 950002-CA 
v. : Priority No- 2 
BRENT THOMAS SILVERS, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for two counts of 
burglary, both second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-202 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appeal is whether the 
eyewitness identification of defendant by Sergeant William Brown 
of the Salt Lake City Police Department was reliable and hence 
admissible at defendant's trial. 
A trial court's decision to admit evidence of an 
eyewitness identification and to allow an eyewitness to make an 
identification during trial is a question of law that is reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 
1991). However, the standard for determining whether an 
eyewitness identification is sufficiently reliable to render it 
admissible conveys a measure of discretion to the trial court, 
and the trial court's findings of fact underlying its reliability 
determination will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. Id. 
at 781 n.3. Accord State v. Perry, No. 940728-CA, Slip. Op. at 
5-6 (Utah App. July 13, 1995). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Const, art* I, sec. 7: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of burglary, both 
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1995), and two counts of theft, both class B misdemeanors, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 6-8) . 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of 
his identification at a -showup by Sergeant William Brown of the 
Salt Lake City Police Department as well as his in court 
identification by Brown on the ground that the showup was unduly 
suggestive and that Brown's identification of defendant was 
therefore unreliable (R. 32). Following a hearing, the trial 
court entered extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law 
(R. 126-129) . (A copy of the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusion of law is attached hereto as addendum A.) Based on 
its findings of facts, the trial court denied defendant's motion 
to suppress (R. 130). (A copy of the trial court's order denying 
defendant's motion to suppress is attached hereto as addendum B.) 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as 
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charged in the information (R. 117-118). Defendant filed a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict in which 
he asked that the two theft charges be dismissed on the grounds 
that the State had failed to establish the value of the property 
underlying defendant's theft convictions (R. 131-132). The trial 
court granted defendant's motion (R. 155), and it sentenced 
defendant to two concurrent terms of one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison (R. 156-157). Defendant appeals from that 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Sergeant William Brown, a 23 year veteran of the Salt 
Lake City Police Department, was working as a security officer at 
the Little America Hotel on the night of February 15, 1994 (R. 
173-74). While walking the grounds of the hotel with a 
maintenance worker at about 7:30 in the evening, Brown noticed a 
"white small car that looked like a Subaru Justy parked in the 
loading dock area" (R. 174, 176) . Brown did riot consider the 
vehicle's presence particularly unusual because people often 
parked there to offload equipment or pick up hotel employees (R. 
175). As he walked toward the car, he looked beyond it and saw 
"one of [the hotel's] console TVs sitting out on the lawn" behind 
the car (R. 175). Brown knew that other hotel televisions had 
been stolen in recent burglaries in which sliding glass doors on 
the outer lodges had been pried open so that the televisions 
could be removed (R. 174). 
Although Brown did not initially see the driver of the 
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car, when he noticed that it was backed up and in "very close 
proximity to the television set, [he] ran to the driver's side of 
the vehicle and took a look at the driver" (R. 176). At about 
the same time, the white car started to leave the loading dock 
area and drove right in front of Brown (R. 175)• 
Brown noticed that one of the front fenders of the 
otherwise white car was yellow in color and that the hatchback 
window and side windows were tinted all the way around the car 
and may have been covered with black tape (R. 176-77). Brown 
also recorded the license plate number of the vehicle and 
reported it to dispatch (R. 178). 
Brown got a "clear look" at the driver (R. 178). 
Specifically, Brown had an unobstructed view of the driver's face 
in profile for approximately five seconds (R. 177), and the 
loading dock area was well-lighted (R. 176). There were also 
city street lights nearby (R. 176). Brown described the driver 
as a white adult male with "blondish-brown hair, over the collar" 
and wearing a white pullover sweater or sweat shirt (R. 177). 
Approximately two weeks later, Brown was contacted by 
Detective Gil Arnaz and asked to view a photo array consisting of 
several individuals who were similar in appearance and that 
matched his description-of the driver (R. 178-79), Brown 
selected a photograph of defendant from the array and identified 
him as the driver of the white car (R. 179, 304-05). Although 
Brown testified that he was not "one hundred percent sure" of his 
identification of defendant, he indicated that he was so certain 
4 
that he would have arrested defendant based on his identification 
of him (R. 179). 
The day after he viewed the photo array, March 5, 1994, 
Brown was on duty for the Salt Lake City Police (R. 180)• That 
evening, Brown heard dispatch report that there was a burglary in 
progress at Little America (R. 180, 188). Brown used his radio 
to tell officers responding to the call to look for a white 
Subaru hatchback with tinted windows (R. 180). Brown then drove 
to Little America because he wanted to look for the car he had 
seen on February 15, 1994 and because he was the "second sergeant 
for that area" (R. 180). 
Upon arriving .at Little America, Brown saw the same 
white car he had seen at the hotel two weeks earlier (R. 181). 
Acting on his own initiative and without first speaking to any of 
the officers on the scene, Brown looked at an individual that was 
handcuffed and sitting in the back of a patrol car. Brown 
immediately recognized that the person was uncjer arrest and that 
he was in fact the person who had been driving the white car on 
February 15, 1994 (R. 181-83, 199-201, 209), 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's decision to admit evidence of 
Sergeant Brown's eyewitness identification of defendant should be 
upheld. Brown had a good opportunity to observe defendant, and 
he was focused on looking at defendant in hopes of identifying 
him at a later date. Nothing in the record suggests that Brown's 
ability to see defendant was impaired, and Brown's subsequent 
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identification of defendant two weeks later at another crime 
scene was spontaneous. Finally, although defendant was 
handcuffed and in the back of a police car when Brown identified 
him, the circumstances as a whole demonstrate that Brown's 




THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
SERGEANT BROWN'S EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION OF 
DEFENDANT WAS RELIABLE AND THAT EVIDENCE OF 
THAT IDENTIFICATION AS WELL AS BROWN'S IN 
COURT IDENTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT WAS 
THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE 
The trial court's decision to admit eyewitness 
identification at defendant's trial was correct. On appeal, 
defendant does not attack any of the trial court's findings of 
fact. Rather, he attacks only the trial court's ultimate 
determination that Brown's identification of defendant was 
reliable under article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
Though a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness, the 
trial court's determination on this issue is entitled to some 
deference because the reliability standard itself conveys to the 
trial court a measure of discretion. State v. Perry, No. 940728-
CA, Slip. Op. at 5-6 (Utah App. July 13, 1995). As demonstrated 
below, the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting 
evidence of Brown's identification of defendant. 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court articulated a "reliability" standard for 
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determining the admissibility of eyewitness identification 
testimony in criminal cases under article I, section 7 of the 
Utah Constitution. In so doing, the Court expressly departed 
from the federal "undue suggestiveness" test called for under 
Neil v. Biqqers, 409 U.S. 188# 198-99, 93 S. Ct. 375, 381-82 
(1972). Recognizing that the Ramirez reliability standard 
"meet[s] or exceed[s] the rigor of the federal standard [,]" 
defendant has elected to proceed solely under the Utah 
Constitution. Br. of Appellant at 6 n.4. Brown's identification 
of defendant easily passes constitutional muster under Ramirez. 
Ramirez requires trial courts to consider the "totality 
of the circumstances" surrounding an eyewitness identification 
and determine its reliability based on the following factors: 
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view 
the actor during the event; (2) the witness's 
degree of attention to the actor at the time 
of the event; (3) the witness's capacity to 
observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity; (4) whether the 
witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event 
being observed and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember and relate 
it correctly. This last area includes such 
factors as whether the event was an ordinary 
one in the mind of the observer during the 
time it was observed, and whether the race of 
the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 
493 (Utah 1986)) . 
Based on the factors outlined above, the facts of this 
case support the trial court's finding of reliability. 
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A. Sergeant Brown Had An Excellent 
Opportunity To View Defendant At The 
Time Of The Incident At Little America 
On February 15, 1994. 
The first factor to consider in determining the 
reliability of Brown's identification of defendant is the 
opportunity Brown had to view defendant on February 15, 1994. 
Brown's attention focused on defendant's vehicle after he noticed 
a television set on the lawn outside a room at the Little America 
Hotel. Upon seeing the television and defendant's car starting 
to leave the area, Brown ran toward defendant's car to look at 
the driver. He had an unobstructed view of defendant face in 
profile for approximately five seconds at a distance of about 
five feet away. Although it was nighttime, the area was well lit 
by lights surrounding the Little America loading dock as well as 
city lights along Main Street (R. 127). Nothing in the record 
suggests that there were distracting noises or activity. On the 
contrary, the evidence shows that, with the exception of the 
maintenance worker who was walking with Brown,'' the area was 
deserted and quiet until defendant started his car engine. Under 
the circumstances, Brown had a good opportunity to view 
defendant. Cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 782 (identification deemed 
reliable where witness viewed the defendant, who was wearing a 
scarf to mask the lower portion of his face and was crouched in a 
shadowy area, for a "few seconds" to a "minute" at a distance of 
approximately ten feet and witness's view of the defendant was 
sometimes obstructed by defendant's accomplice). 
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B. Brown's Attention Was Focused On 
Defendant Because The Officer Was Trying 
To Observe Defendant In Hopes 
Identifying Him Sometime Later. 
The second reliability factor is Brown's degree of 
attention to defendant. In this case, Brown's attention was 
heightened upon his discovery of the television console on the 
lawn outside of a hotel room. He knew that other television sets 
had been stolen from ground level rooms in recent weeks and that 
a car was parked at the nearby loading dock (R. 126). He 
immediately refocused his attention on the nearby car when its 
engine started. He ran toward the car and, as defendant 
concedes, "was attentive and actively focused on making an 
accurate identification" of the car's driver. Br. of Appellant 
at 7. As defendant recognizes, the second factor weighs in favor 
of a finding of reliability. Cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 
(witness was fully aware that a robbery was in progress and 
testified that he "stared at the gunman" so that he would be able 
to provide a "good description" of him to police). 
C. Brown, An Experienced Police Officer, 
Had The Capacity To Observe Defendant. 
The third reliability factor is whether Brown had the 
capacity to observe defendant when defendant drove by him outside 
the outside the hotel on February 15, 1994. Nothing in the 
record suggests that Brown had any physical or mental impairment 
that may have interfered with his capacity to observe defendant. 
Nor does the record suggest that Brown was fatigued, injured or 
otherwise impaired. On the contrary, the record shows that Brown 
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reacted quickly upon seeing the television by refocusing his 
attention on the nearby car and running toward it as soon as he 
heard its engine start. As an experienced police officer, Brown 
obviously recognized the importance of getting a good look at the 
driver of the car and did everything possible to enhance his 
ability to make an accurate identification of defendant. Cf. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 783 (identification upheld where witness was 
struck in the stomach with a pipe during a struggle with the 
defendant's accomplice and was then threatened with a pistol). 
D. Brown's Identification Of Defendant Was 
Spontaneous And Remained Consistent. 
The fourth reliability factor is whether Brown's 
identification was made "spontaneously and remained consistent 
thereafter or whether it was a product of suggestion. Relevant 
circumstance to considered when evaluating this factor include 
the length of time that passed between the incident and the 
identification of defendant, the witness's state of mind at the 
time of the incident, the witness's exposure to other information 
from other sources, and the conditions under which defendant was 
presented to the witness for identification. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
at 783. 
Brown selected defendant's photograph from a photo 
array consisting of several pictures two weeks after the February 
15 incident at Little America (R. 127). Although Brown testified 
that he was not one hundred percent certain the photograph of 
defendant he selected was of the person he had seen driving the 
car past him at the hotel, he indicated that he was certain 
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enough that he would have arrested defendant. The next night, 
Brown was on duty for the Salt Lake City Police when he heard a 
report of a burglary in progress at Little America. He provided 
other officers a detailed description of defendant and 
defendant's car over the radio and proceeded to Little America 
(R. 127). Upon his arrival at Little America, Brown walked up to 
a police car and saw defendant in handcuffs in the back seat. He 
then told Officer Whiting that defendant was the person he had-
seen at the hotel two weeks earlier (R. 128). 
While the fact that defendant was in custody at the 
time Brown identified him would normally weigh against the State, 
the trial court recognized that Brown went to Little America and 
identified defendant on his own initiative. Brown was neither 
instructed to go to the hotel by another officer nor directed to 
the car in which defendant was being held in hopes of having him 
identify defendant. Indeed, Brown's first words to other 
officers at the hotel were "that's the guy" referring to 
defendant. As such, Brown's identification of defendant is best 
characterized as spontaneous and consistent with his earlier 
selection of defendant's photograph from an array, the propriety 
of which defendant has never challenged. Considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the forth reliability factor 
points toward a finding of reliability. Cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
783-84 (witness identified defendant no more than hour after 
being robbed and was likely suffering from the "normal agitation 
that would result from being robbed!,]" and his description of 
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the defendant varied slightly over time and descriptions received 
from all witnesses were "somewhat confused"). 
E. Brown Was Investigating A Burglary In 
Progress When He Observed Defendant, 
Which Suggests That His Encounter With 
Defendant Was An Unusual One That Brown 
Would Likely Remember Accurately. 
The last reliability factor to consider under Ramirez 
is the nature of the event observed by Brown and the likelihood 
that he would perceive and remember it accurately. Brown was a 
trained police officer investigating a burglary in progress. 
Clearly, his attention was heightened under the circumstances as 
evidenced by his testimony about how he ran toward defendant's 
vehicle in an effort to look at him. Brown provided a detailed 
and accurate description of defendant's vehicle, including the 
fact that the rear windows had been tinted dark or covered with 
tape. He also recorded the license plate number of defendant's 
vehicle and noted that the white car had sustained some damage 
and that the color of the repaired area did nqt match the rest of 
the car. Most importantly, Brown provided what proved to be an 
accurate description of 'defendant. In sum, Brown immediately 
recognized that a crime was underway and strived to make detailed 
observations of defendant and defendant's car. Cf. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 783-84 (witness knew he and his companions were being 
robbed and concentrated on obtaining descriptions of their 
assailants). 
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
trial court's decision to admit Brown's eyewitness identification 
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evidence was correct and should therefore be upheld.1 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should uphold the 
trial court's decision to admit evidence of .Sergeant Brown's 
identification of defendant and affirm defendant's conviction. 
STATEMENT REGARDING NEED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND 
DESIRABILITY OF A PUBLISHED OPINION 
The facts of this case are undisputed, and the issue on 
appeal has been adequately briefed by both parties. Accordingly, 
the State does not believe oral argument will materially assist 
this Court in its deliberations. 
Regardless of its outcome, defendant's appeal will 
break no new legal ground in Utah. Disposition of this appeal by 
issuance of a fully articulated, published opinion is therefore 
unwarranted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ V ^ d a y of July, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTMNGpR 
Assistant Attorney General 
1
 Defendant makes a* passing reference to the notion that 
there were no exigent circumstances to justify Brown's use of a 
showup instead of a lineup to identify defendant. Br. of 
Appellant at 9. Exigent circumstances is not a consideration 
under Ramirez, and defendant failed to raise this argument below. 
This Court should therefore refuse to consider it on appeal. See 
State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 903 (Utah App. 1994) (absent a 
showing of plain error or exceptional circumstances, appellate 
courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal). 
13 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, via first class 
mail, to: 
ROBERT K. HEINEMAN 
ROBERT L. STEELE 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this ^ AS"^day of July, 1995. 




Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
On Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
Eyewitness Identification Testimony 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JOHN N. SPIKES, Bar No. 3062 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON 
v DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
-vs-
) CaseNo.941900704FS 
BRENT THOMAS SILVERS, 
' Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came regularly for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis 
Frederick, Third District Court Judge, on August 9, 1994. The plaintiff was represented by its 
attorney, John N. Spikes, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, and the defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney, Robert L. Steele. The Court having heard the evidence and 
argument presented by the parties, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS QF FACT 
On February 15,1994, while working as a security guard at Little America, located at 534 
South Main, Salt Lake City, Sergeant Brown, a 23-year veteran of the Salt Lake City Police 
Department, at approximately 7:15 to 7:30 PM, observed a white, older model Subaru parked in 
the loading dock driveway at Little America. The officer was aware of a history of burglaries 
and thefts from ground level apartments of both televisions and television remote controls. 
2. Brown, at the time of seeing the Subaru, simultaneously saw a television console 
sitting outside a ground level apartment. The Subaru was backed up to the television. The 
Subaru had blacked-out windows by the use oft pe and an unusual color. 
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3. While going to inspect the circumstances, a white male driver with long, shoulder-
length hair drove past the officer, leaving rapidly. The officer obtained a view of the individual 
within approximately five feet of a well-lighted area. 
4. Approximately two weeks later, Brown saw a photo spread of individuals and selected 
one he thought to be the defendant, but he was not one hundred percent sure. 
5. Then on March 5th of 1994, while on duty with the Salt Lake City Police Department, 
Officer Brown heard a radio report of a potential burglary in progress at Little America. Upon 
hearing that report, Brown announced over the radio a description of the Subaru he had seen on 
February 15,1994, which was heard by Officer Whiting. 
6. Whiting responded on March 5th, 1994, to Little America, where he observed a 
television moved onto the balcony of a ground-level apartment through jimmied doors and 
obtained a description of the suspect from the on-duty security guard. 
7. Whiting saw the described vehicle parked across the street from the burglarized 
apartment. He checked over the radio its registration and found it wa£ registered to the 
defendant. He thereafter, over the radio, obtained a description of the defendant from the driver's 
license information. Whiting observed the vehicle which fit the description of the suspect 
vehicle which he had heard over the air and he observed it was modified for hauling loads. The 
description that he observed on the vehicle was that previously given by Brown over the air. 
Whiting waited in the area and subsequently spotted the defendant at a public pay phone near the 
area of the burglary, looking nervous, making furtive movements and looking like he was not 
really talking on the phone. 
8. The suspect matched the description that Whiting had obtained from the driver's 
license bureau. Officer Whiting approached the defendant, asked what he was doing, and asked 
for his name. The defendant gave a false name. The officer then asked for identification and was 
given the defendant's driver's license which identified him as the owner of the suspect vehicle. 
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9. When asked if he owned the suspect car, the defendant replied yes and stated he had 
parked it near the station to use the pay phone. Whiting determined at that point he had probable 
cause to make the arrest and did so. 
10. He did not Mirandize the defendant. 
11. Sergeant Brown subsequently arrived at the scene and on his own volition IDfd the 
defendant as the same suspect in the February 15,1994, incident. Wahlin overheard some 
comments of the defendant, but thought that these comments were made after the defendant was 
under arrest. 
WHEREFORE, having herefore entered its Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The identification of the defendant by Whiting was not tainted or suggestive. Brown 
just relaying, as a good officer should, the information he had with regard to the previous 
burglary and the vehicle description, was acting in a reasonable fashion. 
2. The statements made by the defendant prior to the arrest are not suppressable. The 
defendant responded to preliminary investigatory questions of Whiting, which Whiting was 
authorized to ask in attempting to determined if the defendant was connected with the crime, 
pursuant to 77-8-1 of the Utah Code. 
3. However, any statements made by the defendant post arrest, before the defendant was 
Mirandized, if there are any such statements, are excludable. 
4. Officer Whiting established articulable facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion to 
believe the defendant was the suspect and his questions of the defendant prior to the arrest were 
in furtherance of that effort to determine if the defendant was the owner of the described suspect 
vehicle pursuant to Title 77-7-15. 
5. Any statements made to Detective Arnaz declining to discuss matters further are 
suppressed. 00128 
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6. Any statements made by the defendant post arrest, prior to being Mirandized, are 
likewise excludable and to be suppressed. 
7. There was nothing unduly suggestive or inappropriate about Officer Brown's 
identification of the defendant. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ROBERT L.STEELE 
Legal Defenders Association 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Robert Steele, 
at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, Salt Lake City UT 84111, this 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
JOHN N. SPIKES, Bar No. 3062 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-




Hon. J. Dennis Frederick 
Based upon the Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
E l . DENNIS FREDERI 
strict Qourt 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing to Robert 
at the office of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association, Salt Lake City UT 84111, this 
day of September, 1994. 
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